




DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS IN NEW JERSEY
New Jersey was the State which, by the statute of 19151
and the case of In re Ungaro}s Will)2 began the current .move-
ment for the introduction of the declaratory judgment into
American procedure. Appreciation of its beneficent effect is
attested by the fact that thirty-one American jurisdictions8 have
now adopted it as an aid in the solution of contested issues of
law, before one party or the other has incurred the risk of loss
or damage by acting upon his own interpretation of his rights
under a contract, will, statute, or other legal instrument or rela-
I Laws 1915, c. 116 (A supplement to an act entitled "An act respecting the
Court of Chancery" [Revision of 1902]), § 7: "Decree to Declare Rights. Sub-
ject to rules, any person claiming a right cognizable in a court of equity, under a
deed, will, or other written instrument, may apply for the determination of any
question of construction thereof, in so far as the same affects such right, and for
a declaration of the rights of the persons interested." On the nature .of the 1915
statute, see Commonwealth Quarry Co. v. Gougherty, 103 N.]. Eq. 642, 149 Atl.
356 (1930).
The Uniform Act was passed in 1924, Laws 1924, c. 140, p. 312, 1911-1924
Supp. §§ 163,351-366. Particular attention is called to § 163,362: "This act is
declared to be remedial; its purpose is, to settle and to afford relief from uncer-
tainty and insecurity with respect to rights, status and other legal relations; and
is to be liberally construed and administered."
'88 N.].Eq. 25, 102 Atl. 244 (1917).
I Declaratory jtt<lgment statutes are to be found in the following states:
Arizona, Code 1928, §§ 4385-90; California, Code Civ. Proc. §§ 1060-2; Colorado,
Stat. 1923, c. 98; Connecticut, Gen. Stat. 1930, § 5334; Florida, Gen. Laws 1927.
§§ 4953-54; Indiana, Burns' Supp. 1929, 680.1-16; Kansas, Comp. Stat. 1923, c. 60,
§§31Z7-32; Kentucky, Carroll's Code of Practice, 1927, § 639a 1-12; Massa-
chusetts, Laws 1929, c. 186; Michigan, Compo Laws 1929, §§ 13903-9; Nebraska,
·Comp. Stat. 1929, c. 20-21, §§ 140-155; Nevada, Compo Laws 1929, §§9440-56;
New Hampshire, Laws 1929, C. 86; New Jersey, Compo Stat. 1924, 163,351-366;
New York, C.P.A. § 473; NOTlth Carolina, Laws 1931, C. 102; N'.orth Dakota,
Comp. Stat. lla, § 7712a 1-16; Ohio, Probate Gode 1931, § 10505, 1-10; Oregon,
Code 1930, 2~1401-1416; Pennsylvania, Cum. Supp. 1928, § 12805a 1-16; Rhode
Island, Compo Stat. 1923, §§ 4951-3, 4955, 4968; Smtth Car:olina, Laws 1922, No.
542; South Dakota, Compo Laws 1929, § 2871A-P; Tennessee, Shannon's Code
1926, § 4726a 1-16; Utah, Laws 1925, c. 24; Virgini(lJ, Code 1930, §6140a-h;
Wisconsin, Comp. Stat. 1929, 269.56; Wyoming, Laws 1923, C. 50.
They are also found in the following: Hawaii, Compo Stat. 1925; §§ 2918-
2923; Philippines, enacted Nov. 8, 1930; Porto Rico, Laws 1931, No. 47, p. 378.
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tion. Its history in continental Europe is ancient,4 and its
modern utility is exemplified by the fact that approximately
two-thirds of the cases in equity decided by the High Oourt in
England are actions for a declaration of rights. 1I A somewhat
similar record may be cited for other English-speaking juris-
dictions, and on the continent the declaratory form of judicial
relief has acquired wide vogue in Germany, Austria, and Swit-
zerland.6 Some six hundred cases in the highest state courts,
since 1921, mark the progress of the movement in the United
States, where it has gained increasingly popular favor, espec-
ially in New York, California, Pennsylvania, Connecticut, Ken-
tucky, and Tennessee.
It is therefore regrettable that New Jersey, which gave
birth to the modern movement in the United States, should, by
judicial interpretation, have somewhat restricted a mode of
relief which has proved so valuable in other jurisdictions. Ap-
parently, this restriction has been due in part to the New J~r­
sey distinction between law and equity, which has induced New
Jersey courts of equity to construe their functions narrowly and
to decline declaratory relief which they considered of a legal
nature, although the issue before them involved the construc-
tion of a written instrument,7 although English courts of Chan-
cery do not hesitate to grant declarations in similar cases,8 and
although prayers for multiple relief are thereby split up, some
being granted and some denied, so as to discourage resort to
the remedy. To be told that on one single state of facts part
of the relief must be sought in a law court, and another in a
court of equity, is not conducive to the efficient settlement of
disputed issues.
The courts of England and the United States have found
the declaratory judgment esp~cially useful in cases of dispute
4 Borchard, The DeclaraJory Judgment-A Needed Procedure Reform (1918)
28 YALE L. ]. 1, 13-30.
I Borchard, ibid. 8.
I, Borchard. ibid.
'This distinction has been discussed in the following cases: Snyder v. Tay-
lor, 88 N.].Eq. 513, 103 Atl. 396 (1918) i Renwick v. Hay, 90 N.].Eq. 148, 106
Ad. 547 (1919) i Paterson v. Currier, 98 N.].Eq. 48, 129 Atl. 711 (1925) i Wight
v. Board of Education of the Town of Westfield. 99 N.].Eq. 843, 133 AtJ. 387
(1926) i Union Trost Co. v. Georke, 103 N.].Eq. 159, 142 Ad. 560 (1928) i Englese
v. Hyde, 108 N.].Eq. 403, ISS Atl. 373 (1931). For discussion of these cases,
see infra.
• See critical comment upon these cases, infra.
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